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I. Introduction
A. Overview of the Issue
The United States legal system generally affords a criminal defendant the
right to legal representation.' The complete denial of representation and certain
other situations of state interference can infringe the right to counsel.' This
type of denial is per se violative of the right to counsel, and the defendant need
not show any effect on the trial to obtain a reversal of the conviction. The
I. See U.S. CONST. amend. V1 (granting a criminal defendant a right to counsel).
2. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (describing situations in
which prejudice from lack of counsel is presumed).
3. Id.
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presence of counsel is not sufficient to satisfy the defendant's right to counsel if
4that attorney does not provide effective assistance. Unlike the per se
violations, however, the defendant who is alleging that ineffective assistance of
counsel denied him his Sixth Amendment right must generally demonstrate
prejudice to the result of the trial.5 If the ineffective assistance of counsel claim
stems from a conflict of interest that hampered the defendant's attorney, a
defendant may face a burden somewhat less than a showing of prejudice.6
Conflicts of interest can take many forms.7 Historically, the circuit courts
have been divided between deciding that all types of conflicts of interest
warrant the lower burden or deciding that some conflicts warrant the lower
burden while other conflicts justify the prejudice standard applied to traditional
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.' In 2002, the Supreme Court in
Mickens v. Taylor9 cautioned, but did not decide, that some circuits might be
applying the lower burden to too many different types of conflict of interest
situations.' 0 In light of this cautionary advice and other relevant Supreme Court
4. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,771 n. 14 (1970) ("[T1he right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel.").
5. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (outlining the test for a general ineffectiveness of
counsel claim).
6. See id. at 692 (noting Cuyler v. Sullivan's limited presumption of prejudice provided
for conflict of interest challenges).
7. See infra Part I.B.2 (listing the various ways in which a conflict of interest may
present itself in criminal representation).
8. See infra Part II.C (discussing the circuit split concerning the application of the
different tests to different conflicts).
9. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002). In Mickens, the Court declared that a trial
court's failure to make a Cuyler inquiry does not reduce the defendant's burden of proof on a
Sixth Amendment challenge when the defendant did not protest the conflict at the trial level. Id.
at 173-74. Walter Mickens sought habeas relief on the grounds that his trial attorney, Bryan
Saunders, labored under a conflict of interest. Id. at 164-65. The trial court had convicted
Mickens of murdering Timothy Hall. Id. at 164. The defendant learned on appeal that his trial
attorney represented Hall on charges of assault and carrying a concealed weapon up until his
murder. Id. at 165. Neither Mickens, nor his trial attorney, notified the trial court of this
potential conflict, unlike the defense counsel in Holloway. Id. Instead, Mickens argued that the
trial court should have known of the potential conflict because the trial judge who appointed
Saunders to represent Mickens was the same judge who, a few days earlier, had dismissed the
charges against Hall and thereby released Saunders from his appointment to Hall. Id. at 164-65.
Thus Mickens argued that, under Cuyler, the trial judge "reasonably should [have] know[n] that
a conflict exist[ed]" and that the judge's failure to inquire further mandated an automatic
reversal. Id. at 170-71. The Supreme Court declined to extend the Holloway automatic
reversal rule to reach this case. Id. at 172. Rather, the Court ruled that a trial court's failure to
inquire further does not reduce the defendant's burden of proof. Id. at 173-74. Therefore, the
defendant, at a minimum, needed to meet the Cuyler standard to qualify for vacating his
conviction. Id. at 174.
10. See id. at 174-75 (suggesting that the circuit courts overuse the lower burden test).
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precedent, the question is whether different types of conflicts justify imposing
different levels of burden upon the defendant, and if so, when faced with a
conflict of interest challenge, how does a court determine which test to apply?
This Note addresses the question of what standard the courts should apply
when a defendant challenges a conviction based on a conflict of interest that
involves either successive representation or attorney personal interest conflict
situations. It also addresses the effect that a trial court's knowledge of the
potential conflict has on the choice of that standard. In Part II, this Note
outlines the present approaches and the development of Supreme Court
jurisprudence concerning these issues." This Note addresses, in Part 1.C, the
circuit courts' of appeals interpretations of the Supreme Court case law pre-
Mickens, with an emphasis on the Second and Fifth Circuits' frameworks. 2 In
Part III, this Note examines the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mickens v.
Taylor, especially its clarification of Supreme Court precedent and its statement
that some courts may be applying the wrong standard in certain conflict
situations.'" In Part IV, this Note explores the circuit courts' responses to
Mickens.' 4 Then, in Part V, this Note discusses the policy concerns that should
guide decisions on matching the appropriate test to the conflict situation.' 5
Last, in Part VI, this Note recommends a framework to analyze conflict of
interest cases in order to impose the appropriate burden on the defendant.'
6
This Note proposes that three steps are important in determining the
proper test.'7 First, the court must determine the nature of the conflict that the
defendant is asserting and what persons are involved.18 Second, the court
should determine if either the defendant or the defense counsel put the trial
court on notice of a potential conflict of interest. 19 Last, the court must
determine what the answers to the first two questions suggest is the appropriate
test for the court to apply.
II. See infra Parts Il.A-B (discussing the historical development of the Supreme Court
case law in the area).
12. See infra Parts II.C.3-4 (discussing the Beets and Winkler tests).
13. See infra Part Ill (discussing Mickens).
14. See infra Part IV (examining circuit court response to Mickens).
15. See infra Part V (looking at the policy considerations involved in the various tests and
raised by the different conflicts).
16. See infra Part VI (suggesting a model for courts to use to address conflict of interest
cases).
17. See infra Part VI (outlining a proposed framework for choosing the proper test to
apply to a given conflict of interest situation).
18. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the types of conflicts).
19. See infra Part Il.B.2 (discussing the duty of the trial court).
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B. Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel.2°
The principal purpose of counsel is to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.2
Central to this purpose is the Sixth Amendment guarantee to ensure that the
defendant has sufficient access to trained representation.22 As the Supreme Court
has noted, proper counsel is "critical to [the] ability" of the adversarial system to
achieve a just and fair result.23 The typical criminal defendant needs counsel
because he is unfamiliar with the law, unknowledgeable about the rules of trial, and
unprepared to counter skilled prosecution.24 Without counsel, a defendant may
stand trial on false charges and face a conviction on faulty evidence and witnesses.2
Courts also deem the right to counsel necessary to ensure the "fundamental human
rights of life and liberty."26 Finally, the right to counsel is vitally important because
it provides the means to ensure the protection of every other right of the criminal
defendant.
2'
The Supreme Court has stated that for the right to counsel to be meaningful, it
requires more than the mere presence of a licensed attorney, it also requires the right
to have aid that will "produce just results. 28 In Powell v. Alabama,29 the Supreme
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.").
21. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984) (discussing values served
by the Sixth Amendment).
22. Id. at 684.
23. See id. at 685 (discussing values served by the Sixth Amendment).
24. See Johnson v. Zebrest, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (explaining the need for
effective assistance of counsel).
25. See id. at 463 (discussing the dangers to a fair and just trial that competent counsel
guards against).
26. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,69-70 (1942) (discussing the importance of
the Sixth Amendment).
27. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 179 n. 1(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Of all
the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most
pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have." (quoting United States
v. Chronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1984))).
28. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,685 (1984) ("An accused is entitled to be
assisted by an attorney... who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.").
29. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, the defendants asserted that they
were denied the right to counsel. Id. at 57. The defendants were facing rape charges. Id. The
Supreme Court found that the defendants were denied the aid of counsel in a substantial
manner. Id. at 58. The defendants made an appearance for arraignment without aid of counsel,
and the trial judge appointed the entire local bar counsel until a member of the bar stepped up to
represent the defendants. Id. at 49. When the trial began six days later, the defendants still
appeared to be without specific counsel. Id. at 53. An attorney from another bar then spoke,
saying he would like to assist the defendants once the court had appointed a specific attorney.
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Court first outlined this expanded protection.30 At a pretrial appearance, the trial
court appointed all of the attorneys who were present as counsel for the
defendant. 3' The trial court in Powell did not appoint the defendant a specific
counsel until moments before the trial started.32 The late appointment made the
preparation of a defense and the investigation of facts to support a defense a
practical impossibility.33 The Supreme Court held that this compelled lack of
preparation equated to a denial of the right to counsel.34 In subsequent
decisions, the Supreme Court has stated that the Sixth Amendment guarantee is
the right to effective counsel, not just the presence of counsel.35 Encompassed
in the right to effective assistance of counsel is the right to counsel
unencumbered by a conflict of interest.
36
1. Conflicts of Interest as a Category of Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel Claims
The courts view a challenge based upon an attorney's alleged conflict of
interest as a specific type of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.37 Thus,
Id. at 53. The trial judge then appointed a member of the local bar. Id. at 56. However, that
attorney did not have any time to investigate or prepare a defense as the trial began a few
moments later. Id. at 57-58. Thus, although the trial court appointed the entire local bar
counsel earlier and the specific counsel right before trial, the Supreme Court stated that this
action was too indefinite or close to trial to constitute sufficient representation. Id. at 53. The
Court stated that this mass appointment did not place any degree of responsibility on anyone for
the matter. Id. at 58. Moreover, the Court stated that the mass appointments were "little more
than an expansive gesture." Id. at 56. Thus, the Court held that the defendants did not receive
the intended benefits of the right to counsel. Id. at 58.
30. See id. at 58 (holding that the "defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in
any substantial sense").
31. Id. at 49.
32. See id. at 56 (noting that until the day of trial, the trial judge had only appointed the
entire local bar counsel without imposing responsibility on any one attorney for the case).
33. See id. at 58-59 (stating that although expediency is a valid pursuit, a defense counsel
must have an opportunity to familiarize himself with the case).
34. See id. at 58 ("[W]e hold that defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any
substantial sense.").
35. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("[I]he right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 387 U.S. 759,
771 n. 14 (1970))); see also Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,446 (1940) ("The Constitution's
guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment.").
36. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment
contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring
that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests.").
37. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (noting that conflicts of interest present "one type of
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the focus of the courts is not upon the mere presence or lack of a conflict of
interest, but rather upon ensuring a fair and reliable result. 8 Even though
defendants have a limited right to waive counsel, courts take conflicts of
interest challenges very seriously.39 A conflict of interest threatens the
guarantee of effective counsel not because of what it causes an attorney to do,
but because of what it might keep an attorney from doing.40 For instance, the
danger exists that an attorney might not engage in plea negotiations, effectively
cross examine one client while representing another, or challenge the admission
of some evidence harmful to one client but beneficial to the other because of
the disparate impact that these activities might have on his respective clients.4'
Not all conflicts, however, present the same concerns, and it is important to
determine the type of conflict to understand the dangers involved.42
2. Types of Conflicts
One can group conflicts of interest for attorneys representing defendants
into three main categories: concurrent representation of clients with conflicting
interests, successive representation of clients with conflicting interests, and
conflicts that pit the attorney's personal interests against those of the defendant.
The relevant clients in both concurrent and successive representation conflicts
can be two or more codefendants,43 a defendant and a witness,4 or a defendant
actual ineffectiveness claim").
38. See Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1272 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("[T]he purpose of
the Sixth Amendment... is to assure a fair trial based on competent representation.").
39. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) (stating that the trial court has
discretion to refuse waivers of conflicts of interest). The exact reach of the right to waiver is not
addressed in this Note as it is beyond the scope of the central question, but it remains an
important issue in conflict-of-interest jurisprudence.
40. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978) ("Joint representation of
conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing.").
41. See id. at 490 (highlighting examples of problems a conflicted attorney might face).
42. See infra Part V.A (discussing the dangers and policy issues behind the various types
of conflicts).
43. See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485 (1978) (finding a conflict when an attorney
represented multiple defendants in one trial); see also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783-85
(1987) (addressing a conflict in which two partners represented codefendants in successive
trials).
44. See Mountjoy v. Warden, 245 F.3d 31, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2001) (addressing a potential
concurrent representation conflict in which defendant's attorney concurrently represented a key
government witness); see also Enoch v. Gramley, 70 F.3d 1490, 1495 (7th Cir. 1995)
(addressing a potential successive representation conflict in which defendant's attorney
represented a government witness in a prior matter).
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and another interested person.4" Among the situations that can present a
conflict of interest involving the attorney's personal interests are literary rights
contracts for the defense attorney,46 fear of reprimand from the judge,47 and
contingent fee arrangements.48 The most common claims are those based on
joint representation of codefendants.49 The question centers on the burden the
defendant must meet for each type of conflict of interest, especially in light of
Mickens's concerns over the extensive application of the test imposing the
lower burden on the defendant.50
3. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) Guidelines for
Conflicts of Interest
In addressing conflicts of interest claims, the courts have some guidance
from outside sources.5' Of particular interest, the drafters of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure (FRCP) have created a special rule for addressing
concurrent representation but have not created any rules for addressing other
types of conflicts. 52 Specifically, Rule 44(c) mandates that the trial court
inquire into the nature of the potential conflict and advise each defendant of the
right to effective counsel.53 The Supreme Court has inferred that the reasoning
45. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164-66 (2002) (addressing a potential
successive representation conflict involving the defendant and the victim); see also Collins v.
Johnson, No. 01-35585, 2002 WL 826333, at *1-2 (9th Cir. May 1, 2002) (addressing a
potential concurrent representation conflict involving the defendant and an associated lawyer's
representation of the victim's mother), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1119 (2003).
46. See Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1274 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that the media rights
contract presented a grave "potential conflict of interest," but finding no adverse effect).
47. See United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (addressing an alleged
conflict in which the defendant claimed that his attorney should have requested a continuance
but failed to do so because the attorney was afraid the judge would reprimand him and his firm).
48. See Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1993) (considering a conflict-of-
interest claim based on a contingency fee arrangement with the defense attorney).
49. See Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly": How the Court Sees Motions to
Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1201, 1203 (1989) (stating that
courts and academics have focused mostly on joint representation conflicts).
50. See infra Part IV (examining similarities and differences in how various circuits
addressed conflicts cases after Mickens).
51. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 nn.10-11 (1980) (noting that both the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the ethics rules address conflicts of interest).
52. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 175-76 (2002) (discussing the FRCP's differing
treatment of concurrent and prior conflicts of interest).
53. See FED. R. CIuM. P. 44(c) ("[T~he court must promptly inquire with respect to such
joint representation and must personally advise each defendant of [his] right[s].").
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for this distinction is that the drafters believed that concurrent representation
presented a greater threat to a fair trial than any other conflict type.54
Nevertheless, case law suggests that even with the heightened danger in
concurrent representation, the failure to follow the mandates of Rule 44(c) does
not alone justify reversal. 55
II. Historical Evolution of the Conflict Standards
A. Strickland v. Washington: The Basic Test for Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims
The Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington16 established the standard
for a general ineffective counsel claim based on the Sixth Amendment.57 The
defendant in Strickland alleged that his attorney, in failing to perform several
tasks, denied him effective assistance of counsel.58 In addressing the claim, the
Court noted that it had never before addressed a claim of "actual
ineffectiveness" in a case that proceeded through trial.59 The Court then
declared that the litmus test for an ineffectiveness claim is "whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
54. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175 (noting that different conflicts present different
difficulties and that the FRCP account for these differences).
55. See United States v. Crespo De Llano, 830 F.2d 1532, 1539 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating
that a failure to inquire does not mandate reversal in all situations); United States v. Carr, 740
F.2d 339, 348 (5th Cir. 1984) (same); United States v. Bradshaw, 719 F.2d 907,915 (7th Cir.
1983) (same); United States v. Arias, 678 F.2d 1202, 1205 (4th Cir. 1982) (same).
56. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the defendant claimed
that his counsel's performance denied him effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment because of his counsel's failure to perform several tasks. Id. at 675. Most
notably, defendant claimed that his counsel failed to investigate witnesses, seek sufficient
psychiatric opinions, and prepare sound arguments for sentencing. Id. At the trial level, the
defendant received appointed counsel and pleaded guilty against the advice of counsel. Id. at
672. The defense counsel felt hopeless at this point and decided that the plea gave sufficient
information to help defendant receive a reduced sentence without the risk of having defendant
face cross-examination. Id. at 673. The Supreme Court upheld the denial of a writ of habeas
corpus finding that the aggravating circumstances far outweighed any possible mitigating effect
the other materials might have had, and therefore stated that the defendant failed to show
prejudice to his case. Id. at 698-701.
57. See id. at 687 (stating the requirements a defendant must satisfy in order for a court to
find ineffective assistance of counsel).
58. See id. at 675-76 (stating the two prong test defendant must satisfy in order for a court
to find ineffective assistance of counsel).
59. Id. at 683.
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the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result., 60 Thereafter, the
Court announced that a defendant must satisfy a two prong test: (1) that
defense counsel's performance did not meet an objective standard of
reasonableness; and (2) that the failure of counsel prejudiced the defense. 6,
Applying the test to the facts of the case, the Court stated that the evidence
against the defendant was so overwhelming and the mitigating effect of the
alternate evidence was so minimal that the defendant failed to show prejudice.62
The two prongs of the Strickland standard impose a heavy burden on a
defendant. The first prong of the test 63 is based on objective professional
reasonableness." This prong is premised upon the "duty of loyalty" that the
defense counsel must give to the client.65 The ultimate focus of this prong is on
ensuring a reliable and fair trial process.66 The second prong of the general
ineffectiveness claim 67 focuses on outcome. 6s Because ensuring a reliable
outcome is the principle underlying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the
failure of performance must be "prejudicial to the defense."69 This burden on
the defendant is high and requires more than some possible effect on the
outcome. 70 The Supreme Court stated that "prejudicial to the defense" means
that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Further, a
"reasonable probability" is one that can destroy confidence in the result.72
60. Id. at 686.
61. See id. at 687 (discussing the requirements for a defendant to achieve a reversal of his
conviction based on an ineffectiveness claim).
62. See id. at 698-701 (applying the test to the facts of the case).
63. See id. at 687 ("First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient.").
64 See id. at 688 (noting that a more exact standard is inappropriate because the Sixth
Amendment refers simply to counsel and not specific requirements and because more exact
standards could hinder the individualized advocacy efforts of counsel).
65. See id. (discussing the performance aspect of the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel).
66. See id. at 689 (reflecting on the purpose of the performance prong of the test).
67. See id. at 687 (stating that the second burden the defendant must show to warrant
reversal of a conviction is that counsel's deficient representation "prejudiced the defense").
68. See id. at 691 (declaring that a deficient performance by counsel, absent an "effect on
the judgment," does not justify reversal (citing United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361,364-65
(1981))).
69. See id. at 691-92 (explaining rationale of Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
70. See id. at 693 (describing the level of effect on the outcome needed to garner
reversal).
71. Id. at 694.
72. Id.
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Thus, the burden on the defendant lies somewhere between a showing of"some
conceivable effect on the outcome" and a showing that the failures "more likely
than not altered the outcome of the case."73
The Supreme Court did recognize several exceptions to the prejudice
standard it announced for general ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
For instance, the Court mentioned that two situations warrant a finding of
per se prejudice: (1) when the defendant lacked representation actually or
constructively; and (2) when the state interfered with the attorney's
representation in a significant way.7 4 The Court also reaffirmed the rule,
announced four years earlier,75 of a limited presumption of prejudice in
cases involving an actual conflict of interest.
76
B. Cuyler v. Sullivan: Concurrent Representation and Presumed Prejudice
1. The Standard
A conflict of interest challenge is a specific type of ineffective counsel
claim. 77 As such, the Supreme Court has analyzed the multiple-representation
conflict of interest claims differently from the more typical ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.71 In the mid-1 900s, the Supreme Court recognized
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel included the right to counsel
unimpeded by a court-mandated concurrent representation. 79 But, it was not
until Cuyler v. Sullivan8 0 in 1980 that the Supreme Court outlined the test for
73. See id. at 693-94 (marking off the clear lower and upper bounds of the showing a
defendant must make).
74. See id. at 692 (discussing situations that involve a departure from the heavier burden
of prejudice).
75. See infra Part II.B (discussing the conflict-of-interest standard announced in Cuyler v.
Sullivan).
76. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (discussing Cuyler).
77. See id. at 683 (noting that the Supreme Court has addressed specific types of
ineffective assistance. cases, but has not addressed ineffective assistance claims generally).
78. See id. (discussing the different standard for multiple-representation claims).
79. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (discussing the guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment).
80. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). In Cuyler, the defendant Sullivan, seeking
reversal of his conviction, was one of three codefendants in a murder case represented by the
same counsel. Id. at 337. Sullivan alleged that his attorneys failed to provide effective
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment because the attorneys also
represented the other two defendants in the murder case. Id. at 339. Specifically, Sullivan
alleged that his counsel rested the defense after the prosecution's case because they feared that
any witnesses that testified might expose the other two defendants. Id. at 339-40. Notably,
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determining when concurrent representation produces ineffective assistance of
counsel. 8' In Cuyler, two attorneys represented three codefendants in connection
with a murder charge.82 Notably, at no time during the trial did the defendant
or his attorneys object to the multiple representation. 3 The jury convicted
Sullivan and acquitted his two codefendants.84 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, in granting reversal, held that Sullivan only
needed to show the possibility of prejudice to obtain reversal.85 The Supreme
Court remanded the case, stating that the Third Circuit applied the wrong
standard.86 In so doing, the Court announced a new test requiring that, absent a
timely trial objection, a defendant must show that there was (1) an actual
conflict of interest, and (2) that this conflict adversely affected counsel's
performance.87 An actual conflict of interest occurs if the interests of the
lawyer and the client diverge during the representation in regards to "a material
factual or legal issue or to a course of action." 88 The majority cited with
approval prior Supreme Court precedent stating that counsel must have
"actively represented" conflicting interests in order for a defendant to establish
a constitutional violation.89 The Supreme Court noted that this standard is
easier to meet than a typical ineffectiveness of counsel claim. 90 Nevertheless,
the Court held that a mere possibility of conflict is not enough to warrant
reversal of a conviction9' because, even though multiple representation presents
neither Sullivan nor his attorneys objected to the multiple-representation at any time during the
trial. Id. at 337-38. The Supreme Court stated that, absent a timely objection at trial, a court
should grant a reversal based upon a multiple-representation claim only if the defendant can
demonstrate both (I) an actual conflict of interest and (2) that this conflict adversely affected
counsel's performance. Id. at 348. However, the Court of Appeals only applied a possibility of
conflict test in granting Sullivan a reversal. Id. at 350. Thus, because the Court of Appeals
applied a standard that was too low, the Supreme Court remanded the case for application of the
newly announced test. Id.
81. See id. at 348 (stating the test for a conflict-of-interest claim).
82. See id. at 337-38 (discussing the circumstances of the multiple representation claim).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 338.
85. Id. at 340.
86. Id. at 350.
87. See id. at 348 (outlining test).
88. See id. at 356 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining
the difference between possible conflicts of interest and actual conflicts of interest).
89. Id. at 350 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 72-75 (1942)).
90. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (discussing the lower
burden in Cuyler as opposed to a standard ineffectiveness of counsel claim).
91. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (remanding the case because the
court of appeals applied the wrong standard).
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an inherent possibility of conflict, 92 multiple representation is too valuable for
the court to declare it per se unconstitutional.93 After Cuyler, the question
remained as to whether the standards announced in that multiple-representation
case would apply to all conflicts of interest, including successive representation
conflicts and personal interest conflicts of the defense counsel.94
In Wood v. Georgia,9s a case decided one year after Cuyler, the Supreme
Court again addressed conflicts of interest.96 This case has created confusion in
the courts because of the wording of a key sentence-"If the court finds that an
actual conflict of interest existed... it must hold a new revocation
hearing... "-that has been interpreted both literally and more loosely.97 The
Court used this phrase in declaring its ruling.9" The confusion occurred
because the Court in Wood did not reverse the lower court, but rather said that
the lower court should conduct a more searching analysis to determine if there
was a conflict of interest at trial.99 The problem was that the Court in Wood
used the phrase "actual conflict of interest" without the modifier previously
92. See id. at 348 (discussing the risk of conflict in multiple representation cases).
93. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482-83 (1978) (stating that "[a] common
defense often gives strength against a common attack" (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 92 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
94. See Illinois v. Washington, 469 U.S. 1022, 1023-24 (1985) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of cert.) (noting that most circuit courts have applied Cuyler unthinkingly to all
conflicts-of-interest claims without questioning whether it even applied); see also Mickens v.
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174-76 (2002) (suggesting that the circuit courts may be applying the
wrong standard to nonmultiple representation cases because some have relied on Cuyler
unthinkingly).
95. Wood v. Georgia,450 U.S. 261 (198 1). In Wood, the defendants were charged with
distribution of obscene materials. Id. at 262. The defendants' alleged activity occurred at their
place of work. Id. at 263. From arrest through sentencing, the same lawyer, for whom their
employer paid, represented the defendants. Id. at 266. In addition to paying for the defendants'
attorney, the employer also stated that he would pay any fines they may incur as a result of the
charges. Id. When fines were imposed, however, the defendants' employer, hoping to make a
test case, choose not to pay their fines, causing the defendants to be placed in jail. Id. at 267.
The defendants asserted that the third party payment and the attempt to make a test case
conflicted their attorney. Id. at 267-68. The Court noted that on the present record it could not
determine if an actual conflict existed, but merely could surmise that there was a high possibility
of a conflict. Id. at 272-73. Therefore, the Court remanded the case for a determination
whether "an actual conflict of interest existed" at the trial. Id. at 273.
96. See id. at 262-63 (198 1) (noting that the defendants' counsel may have been under
divided loyalties).
97. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 (2002) (explaining the confusion over
choice of wording in the Wood opinion).
98. See Wood, 450 U.S. at 273 (stating ruling of case).
99. Id.
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found in Cuyler-that the conflict "adversely effect" counsel's performance.'00
Therefore, the lower courts were in confusion over whether the Court in Wood
had declared a new standard apart from Cuyler or whether it was a situation-
specific application of Cuyler. 10' The Supreme Courtin Mickens tried to clarify
this confusion,10 2 but a debate still raged between the Justices in the majority
and those in the dissent.'0 3 Ultimately, the majority's view in Mickens-that
the wording in Wood is merely shorthand for the Cuyler standard'04--controls
and must be followed.
2. Duty of the Trial Court
In addition to outlining the test on appeal for conflict of interest cases, the
Supreme Court in Cuyler also addressed the duty of the trial court to investigate
potential conflicts.'0 s The Court stated that the trial court has a duty to inquire
into a potential conflict of interest if it knows or reasonably should know that a
potential conflict exists.'°6 The performance or nonperformance of this duty
may affect the burden the defendant must satisfy.
The defendant's burden is lower than the Cuyler burden if he, or his
attorney, objected at trial and notified thejudge that a conflict of interest would
impair the effectiveness of the representation.'0 7 If this occurs, the Supreme
Court, in Holloway v. Arkansas,'08 stated that the defendant need only show
100. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171 (discussing the misused statement).
101. See id. at 170 n.3 (discussing some courts' interpretation of the Wood case).
102. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Wood in Mickens).
103. Compare Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 170-72 (2002) (stating that Wood merely
used shorthand to refer to the Cuyler standard) with Mickens, 535 U.S. at 196-98 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority misreads the Wood case).
104. Id. at 171.
105. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345 (1980) (addressing "whether a state trial
judge must inquire into the propriety of multiple representation even though no party lodges an
objection").
106. Id.
107. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 167-68 (discussing the Holloway automatic reversal rule).
108. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). In Holloway, the court appointed one
lawyer to represent three separate defendants. Id. at 476. The lawyer objected on the grounds
that he faced the risk of conflicting interests between the three clients. Id. at 476-77. The trial
judge denied the motion and mandated the continued concurrent representation. Id. at 477-80.
The jury convicted the defendant, and he appealed. Id. at 481. The Supreme Court recognized
that there can be value in multiple representation and did not declare it per se invalid. Id. at
482-83. Nevertheless, the Court held that when the trial court did not appoint new counsel or
inquire into the gravity of the risk after notification of the potential conflict through timely
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that the court failed to inquire into a potential conflict in order to obtain a
reversal of his conviction °-the so-called automatic reversal rule. In
Holloway, the defendant objected to the appointment of an attorney who was
already representing two other defendants facing the same charges.11 During
the trial, the codefendants testified."' The attorney objected, stating that he
could not ask them questions that might incriminate any of the other defendants
he represented.' 2 The trial court overruled the objections and failed to appoint
new counsel or offer further opportunity for clarification of the alleged
conflict." 3  The jury found all the defendants guilty. 14  The defendants
appealed claiming ineffective assistance of counsel." 5 The Supreme Court
reversed and stated that the danger of multiple representation was what this
representation caused the lawyer to refrain from doing, such as cross-examining
witnesses for fear of exposing other defendants." 
6
Courts have stated that the automatic reversal rule is appropriate because
ethics binds the defense counsel not to engage in conflicts, and because the
counsel is in the best position to know of potential conflicts." 7 Thus, if the
situation moved the attorney to object, it must be a grave conflict. Moreover,
the objection puts the trial court on notice that there is a conflict that would
likely prejudice the trial."' Therefore, any attempt to require the defendant to
show prejudice from the conflict would be unfair because the defendant tried to
avoid the conflict by objecting.' '9 Furthermore, without the automatic reversal
rule, it would be impossible for the courts to adjudicate the effects of such
conflicts in a consistent manner.
20
objection, it denied the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. Id. at 484.
109. See id. at 488 (declaring that Glasser established a per se reversal rule when a timely
objection is made and the trial court continues to require multiple representation).
110. See id. at 477 (discussing the circumstances leading to the appointment of one counsel
for three codefendants).
111. Id. at 480.
112. See id. (discussing counsel's performance at the trial).





117. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980) (discussing the rationale for the
automatic reversal rule).
118. See id. (discussing the rationale for the automatic reversal rule).
119. See Hollowayv. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,490-91 (1978) (explaining rationale for the
automatic reversal rule and the pitfalls of a harmless error test).
120. See id. (explaining the rationale for the automatic reversal rule and the pitfalls of a
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C. Choosing a Test: The Circuit Courts' Interpretation ofPre-Mickens
Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court, although creating the standards to apply in
conflict of interest challenges, did not specify when each test should
apply.'21 This omission left the circuits in a state of confusion. Many
circuits interpreted the Supreme Court cases broadly and applied Cuyler
to all conflicts of interest challenges and applied Strickland only to
general ineffectiveness claims. 12 2 The circuits did this even though the
Supreme Court had only addressed concurrent representation conflicts.121
Other circuits, however, developed alternate frameworks of analysis for
more limited application of Cuyler.1
24
1. The General Trend
In the twenty-two years between Cuyler and Mickens, the circuit
courts were in conflict over the appropriate application of the Cuyler test.
It was not even unheard of for a circuit to shift positions from case to
case. 12' Before Mickens, two circuits expressly limited Cuyler to multiple
representation situations. 2 6 Multiple representation for these purposes
harmless error test).
121. See United States ex. rel. Duncan v. O'Leary, 806 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir. 1986)
(noting that the Supreme Court has not established the scope of the Cuyler test).
122. See infra Part I.C.I (presenting an overview of the circuit courts' pre-Mickens
jurisprudence in conflict-of-interest cases).
123. See Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1266 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (noting that the
Supreme Court has not addressed a conflict situation outside of the multiple representation
realm).
124. See infra Parts 11.C.3-4 (discussing the Fifth and Second Circuits' frameworks).
125. Compare Atleyv. Ault, 191 F.3d 865, 870 n.4 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that Cuyleris
not limited to situations involving joint representation, but is extended to other types of
conflicts) with Caban v. United States, 281 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that this
circuit's previous pronouncements that Cuyler applied beyond multiple representation were
dicta, and that Cuyler should actually be limited to multiple representation cases). Sometimes, a
circuit's choice of tests can seem to be confused within a single case. Compare United States v.
Mays, 77 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating at one point that it approves of the Beets
framework, which limits Cuyler to multiple representation situations) with Mays, 77 F.3d at 909
(stating that it was applying Cuyler to ihe conflict based upon a defense attorney's past dealings
with federal authorities).
126. See Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 797 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that recent case law
applies Cuyler to all multiple representation situations, but uses Strickland in other types of
conflicts); see also Caban v. United States, 281 F.3d 778, 782 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting the recent
trend of limiting Cuyler to multiple representation situations and so limiting it).
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included both successive and concurrent representations.127 The Fifth
Circuit is one of the leading examples of a circuit court limiting Cuyler. 28
This limitation, however, was the exception, as other circuits extended
Cuyler well beyond multiple representation situations. 129 The Second,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, in particular, extended Cuyler to virtually all
conflicts of interest. 130 Some circuits expanded the application of Cuyler to
situations such as personal interest conflicts stemming from book and
movie rights contracts 3 ' and conflicts stemming from an attorney's fear of
receiving a reprimand from the trial judge. 32 The circuits did this even
though the Supreme Court never applied Cuyler beyond multiple
representation. 133 Some circuits even expressed the opinion that Cuyler
extended well beyond multiple representation cases, even though they
noted that Cuyler itself involved only a concurrent representation
challenge. 
34
127. See Perillo, 205 F.3d at 798 (rejecting the idea that any real difference exists between
concurrent and successive representation).
128. See infra Part l.C.3 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's approach).
129. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174-75 (2002) (listing cases in which circuit
courts have extended Cuyler beyond multiple representation).
130. See Riggs v. United States, 209 F.3d 828, 831 n. I (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that Cuyler
applies to all Sixth Amendment conflict-of-interest situations); Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304,
307-08 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying Cuyler to a contingency fee arrangement and asserting that
Cuyler applies to all conflict-of-interest situations); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579-80
(9th Cir. 1988) (same). For a discussion of the Second Circuit's extension of Cuyler, see infra
Part II.C.4.
131. See Buenoano v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 1433,1438(1lth Cir. 1992) (applying Cuyler,
without discussion, to a contract giving the defendant's attorney book and movie rights to the
defendant's story); see also United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1980)
(applying Cuyler when the defendant alleged that a media rights contract caused a conflict with
her attorney).
132. See United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55,65 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (applying Cuyler when a
defendant alleged that his attorney failed to request a continuance because of the fear that the
judge would reprimand the attorney or his firm).
133. See Caban v. United States, 281 F.3d 778, 782 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he Court has
never applied Cuyler's rule of presumed prejudice outside the context of multiple representation
of codefendants or serial defendants.").
134. See Riggs v. United States, 209 F.3d 828, 831 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[T]his circuit
applies the Cuyler analysis to all Sixth Amendment conflict of interest claims."); see also
Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1451 n.7 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the circuit has applied
Cuyler outside of multiple representation before and thus applied it in the case at hand); United
States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying Culyer and stating that it is
immaterial that Cuyler was based on multiple representation and that the current defendant's
challenge was based on the attorney's private financial interests).
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2. Expansion of Cuyler Through Modification
Instead of a straight Cuyler or Strickland application, the Seventh, Ninth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits created a modified Cuyler standard for successive
representation cases. 135 These circuits recognized that a conflict based on
successive representation is not as likely to result in ineffective assistance as
one based upon concurrent representation. 136 In this test, the added burden-in
addition to the Cuyler test-that a defendant must meet for successive
representation challenges is either: (1) that the defendant's attorney's prior
representation of the other person is "substantially and particularly related" to
the attorney's representation of the defendant; or (2) that the attorney received
confidential information from the other person that is pertinent to the
defendant's case. ' 37 Although the presence of one of these factors is necessary,
it is not sufficient for a finding of actual conflict. 38 This extension of Cuyler
was reasonable, the courts argued, because finding either alternative factor will
make the dangers of successive representation more in line with those of
concurrent representation. 
39
3. Beets v. Scott: The Fifth Circuit's Framework
In the absence of clear direction from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit,
in Beets v. Scott,'140 developed an important pre-Mickens framework for
135. See Veney v. United States, 738 F.2d 1185, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (adopting a
modified Cuyler test in a successive representation conflict-of-interest challenge); Enoch v.
Gramley, 70F.3d 1490,1496-97(7th Cir. 1995) (same); Maiden v. Bunnell, 35 F.3d 477, 480
(9th Cir. 1994) (same); Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401,1405-06( Ith Cir. 1987)(same). The
Eighth Circuit has also adopted a similar modified test. See United States v. Shepard, 675 F.2d
977, 980 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying a "confidential information" factor in determining the
existence of a conflict of interest in successive representation cases).
136. See Enoch v. Gramley, 70 F.3d 1490, 1496 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[lI]t is generally more
difficult to demonstrate an actual conflict resulting from successive representation." (quoting
Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1988))). But see Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d
775, 798 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the idea that there is any real difference between successive
and concurrent representation); Church v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 1511 n.8 (10th Cir. 1991)
(same).
137. See Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401, 1405-06 (11th Cir. 1987) (outlining the
additional factor that a defendant must show in successive representation challenges).
138. See id. at 1406 (stating that proof of one or both factors does not necessarily equal a
finding of "inconsistent interests").
139. See United States v. Shepard, 675 F.2d 977, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting the
dangers of successive representation, especially dangers involving the use of confidential
information).
140. Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). In Beets, the Fifth Circuit
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determining which ineffective assistance of counsel test to apply.' 4 1 The Fifth
Circuit concluded that courts should limit Cuyler to situations of multiple
representation142 and that Strickland is the more appropriate test for conflicts in
which the attorney's personal interests diverge from the interests of his client.
41
The appeal arose out of a media rights contract that the defendant signed to pay
her attorney in a homicide-for-profit charge.'" The jury convicted Beets of
murder for remuneration. 45 Beets's defense at trial was that she did not know
about the money she might receive as a result of her husband's death until after
her husband disappeared. 146 On appeal, Beets claimed that her attorney had
special knowledge of Beets's awareness of any money she might receive as a
result of her husband's disappearance, and therefore she needed her attorney to
testify. 4' Beets asserted that the media rights contract prevented her attorney
from withdrawing and testifying on her behalf, a situation she claimed
addressed whether Strickland or Cuyler should be the test when a defendant alleges a conflict of
interest based upon a media rights contract with her attorney. Id. at 1260. The defendant in
Beets faced murder charges for the death of her husband. Id. at 1261. In order to pay for her
representation, Beets assigned all the media rights to her attorney's son. Id. A jury convicted
Beets of murder for remuneration. Id. at 1264. After conviction, Beets appealed, claiming that
the media rights contract created a conflict for her attorney and prevented him from withdrawing
from representing her so that he could be a witness in her case. Id. at 1264. Beets argued that
this caused her to receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. The Fifth Circuit analyzed the
relevant Supreme Court cases concerning conflicts of interest and determined that Strickland
was the correct standard for Beets's ineffectiveness claim based upon a media rights contract.
Id. at 1265. The court chose Strickland over Cuyler because it determined that I) the Supreme
Court had only addressed multiple representation cases and that applying Cuyler outside of this
context presented inherent difficulties, 2) that legal ethics strongly suggested against treating
multiple representation and attorney self-interest cases the same, and 3) to extend Cuyler outside
of the multiple representation context would weaken the uniformity sought by Strickland. Id. at
1265--66. Beets ultimately failed in her challenge because the Fifth Circuit determined that the
media rights contract neither hindered her attorney's performance nor destroyed the reliability of
the criminal trial. Id. at 1274. However, the court went even further and noted that Beets's case
would fail under the Cuyler or Winkler tests as well. Id. at 1277-79.
141. See id. at 1268 (noting the absence of Supreme Court authority).
142. Id. at 1265 n.8. The Fifth Circuit defines "multiple representation" as including both
successive representation and concurrent representation situations. Id.
143. See id. at 1272 (explaining when Strickland should apply and when Cuyler should
apply).
144. See id. at 1261 (stating that Beets signed over her media rights to the attorney's son).
145. See id. at 1262 (stating that the jury found that Beets killed her husband for insurance
and pension money).
146. See id. at 1263 (explaining that the attorney tried to negate intent by arguing that for at
least eighteen months, Beets did not know of the potential for money from her husband's
disappearance).
147. Id. at 1274.
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prejudiced her trial.'48 Beets also asserted that her attorney labored under a
separate personal interest conflict due to the media rights contract.'49 The Fifth
Circuit failed to find either of these arguments persuasive. 50 The Fifth Circuit
stated that the Strickland test was the appropriate test in situations not involving
multiple representations.' 5 ' The court stated that Beets failed to meet the
Strickland test because her counsel's conduct did not prejudice her defense.'
The Fifth Circuit listed numerous reasons for applying Strickland, instead
of Cuyler, to the facts of Beets.' The court began by looking at the major
Supreme Court cases starting with Cuyler. 54 The court noted that Cuyler used
the phrase "actively represented" conflicting interests, suggesting that the
conflicts must originate from multiple attorney-client relationships and not a
personal interest "conflict situation."'55 Moreover, the court determined that all
of the cases the Supreme Court cited in Cuyler were multiple representation
cases. 56 The court then noted that the only other times the Supreme Court
addressed alleged conflicts of interest and applied Cuyler were in multiple
representation cases.'1 7 Further, the Fifth Circuit stated that the ethical rules
148. See id. at 1274-75 (laying out Beets's argument that the media rights contract
motivated her attorney to stay in the case, contrary to Beets's best interest).
149. See id. at 1273 (reporting that Beets argued that her attorney committed an ethical
violation in signing the contract that created a conflict of interest).
150. See id. at 1274-75 (noting that Beets failed to show that the media rights contract
influenced her attorney's performance or that her attorney could offer anything more than
cumulative evidence and speculation as a witness).
151. Id. at 1271.
152. Id. at 1273.
153. See id. at 1265-73 (discussing why Cuyler should be limited to multi-representation
cases).
154. See id. at 1266-68 (discussing Cuyler, Wood, Nix, Strickland, and Burger).
155. Id. at 1267.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 1267-68 (discussing Wood, Nix, Strickland, and Burger). The Fifth Circuit
stated that Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), declined to extend Cuyler to situations where
a conflict arose between the attorney's ethical obligation not to commit perjury and the
defendant's desire to do so. Id. at 1267. The Fifth Circuit noted that Wood was effectively a
joint representation case because the defendant's employer's lawyer represented the defendant
and the defendant's and attorney's interests were not always aligned. Id. at 1267. The Fifth
Circuit then stated that Strickland reinforces a limited Cuyler application by quoting sections of
that opinion that refer to multiple representation. Id. Lastly, the Fifth Circuit stated that Burger
v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987), a case in which a defendant's attorney assisted a partner in the
defense of a codefendant, showed that not even all multiple representation situations present
actual conflicts of interest. Id.
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militated against applying Cuyler to situations outside of the multiple
representation context.' 5
The court next examined the practicalities of each type of conflict of
interest.159 The court noted that in a multiple representation situation, the
attorney can be "immobilized by conflicting ethical duties among clients."'60
By contrast, a lawyer in a personal interest conflict case is bound to only one
client and thus the conflict will not immobilize the attorney, although it may
render him ineffective.' 6' Lastly, the Fifth Circuit stated that the purpose of the
Sixth Amendment is to assure a fair trial and not to create an alternate method
of enforcing legal ethics. 62  Thus, the court limited Cuyler to situations
involving multiple representation.
63
In dicta, the majority proceeded to analyze the case under the Cuyler test
in case its choice of the Strickland standard proved to be mistaken.' 64 The
majority stated that Beets failed to meet either prong of the Cuyler test.'65
Beets failed to show an actual conflict, as opposed to a hypothetical one,
because she could not show that her attorney made a choice between his
financial interests and her interests. 66 Beets failed the adverse effect prong
because the courts below "found no conscious effect of the media contract on
158. See id. at 1269-71 (discounting the "duty of loyalty" rationale for extending CuYler
beyond multiple representations). The court noted that the ABA Model Rules distinguish
between conflicts involving competing clients' interests and those involving the attorney's
personal interest. Id. at 1270. The Fifth Circuit stated that these two conflicts are different
because the multiple representation situation is straightforward, whereas an attorney's personal
interests conflict could range from the benign to the severe. Id. Moreover, the court opined that
the problem with an attorney's personal interests being in conflict with those of the client is that
it ultimately reflects on the attorney's competency. Id. The court stated that to apply the lighter
Cuyler standard to this broad range of potential consequences would be a "draconian remedy."
Id.
159. See id. at 1271-72 (noting the effect of the conflicts on the attorney's functioning.)
160. Id. at 1271.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 1272 (arguing that blurring the line between Strickland and Cuyler would
result in a shift in focus from "the overall fairness of the criminal proceeding-the goal of
'prejudice' analysis-to slurs on counsel's integrity-the 'conflict' analysis").
163. See id. at 1260 (stating that Strickland is the better test for situations in which the
attorney's personal interests conflict with those of the client).
164. See id. at 1277 (discussing the alternate holding should Cuyler apply).
165. See id. at 1278 n.26 (stating that Beets did not show either an actual conflict or an
adverse effect). The Mickens Court calls this dual prong analysis of the Cuyler test, stating that
the Cuyler test "is- not properly read as requiring inquiry into actual conflict as something
separate and apart from adverse effect." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n.5 (2002).
166. See Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1277 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (requiring defendant
to show that the attorney "made a choice between possible alternative courses of action"
(quoting Stevenson v. Newsome, 774 F.2d 1558, 1561-62 (11 th Cir. 1985))).
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Beets's attorney's decision not to testify."'167 Thus, the Fifth Circuit rejected
her claims.1
68
4. Winkler v. Keane: The Second Circuit's Framework
The Second Circuit developed a gloss on Cuyler to allow courts to apply it
to conflicts other than multiple representations. 169 In Winkler v. Keane,"0 the
Second Circuit applied a modified Cuyler test to an alleged conflict based upon
a contingency fee arrangement.' 7' The defendant and his family entered into a
contingency fee arrangement whereby the attorney received an extra $25,000 if
the court found the defendant not guilty.'72 The jury convicted Winkler of
murder and sentenced him to twenty-five years to life in prison. 7 3 Winkler
alleged that the contingency fee arrangement created a conflict of interest,
depriving him of the effective assistance of counsel. 17 4 The defendant argued
that the agreement placed his interests adverse to those of his attorney who
would earn the higher fee only if the defendant received no sentence, but
suffered no penalty in compensation if the defendant received a one-day or one
hundred-year sentence.175 In analyzing the appeal, the Second Circuit parsed
167. Id. at 1279.
168. Id. at 1278.
169. See id. at 1284 (King, J., dissenting) (recommending that the Fifth Circuit follow
Winkler in cases involving conflicts outside of multiple representation situations).
170. Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 1993). In Winkler, the defendant faced murder
and weapons possession charges. Id. at 306. In order to pay for the private attorney, Winkler's
family agreed to a contingency fee arrangement whereby the attorney would be paid an
additional sum for an acquittal or not guilty verdict. Id. The jury found Winkler guilty of
second degree murder. Id. Winkler appealed, asserting that the contingency fee arrangement
created an actual conflict of interest. Id. at 307. The court noted that the first inquiry was
whether there was an actual conflict of interest. Id. The Second Circuit stated that an actual
conflict was present because the attorney would only get the bonus money if Winkler was
acquitted or found not guilty. Id. at 307-08. The Second Circuit then broke down the adverse
effect prong of the Cuyler test into two parts: I) finding a viable alternative defense tactic that
could have been pursued and 2) that this alternative strategy "was inherently in conflict with or
not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties or interest." Id. at 309. Although finding
some viable alternative strategies, the court stated that the reason they were not pursed was not
because of the contingent fee arrangement, but rather some other reason. Id. 309-10. Thus, the
court declared that Winkler's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated. Id. at 310.
171. See id. at 308 ("Winkler must meet the Cuyler standard.").
172. See id. at 306 (reprinting a portion of the contingency fee arrangement).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 307.
175. Id.
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the Cuyler "actual conflict" and "adverse effect" prongs into three parts. 176
First, the court looked for an "actual conflict" by examining whether the
defendant's and attorney's interests "diverge[d] with respect to a material
factual or legal issue or to a course of action."177 In applying the second prong
of the Cuyler test, the Second Circuit broke "adverse affect" into two segments:
1) a showing of a plausible alternative defense strategy; and 2) that the
conflicting interests caused the attorney not to pursue this strategy. 71 Applying
the test to the facts of the case, the court noted an actual conflict of interest,
stating that the arrangement created a disincentive for the attorney to pursue a
plea or argue for a lesser sentence. 79 The Second Circuit found that there were
viable alternative strategies that the attorney could have pursued.8 ° The court,
however, stated that Winkler failed to show that the attorney did not pursue
these strategies because of the contingent fee arrangement; thus, it found no
adverse effect.' Thus, in the pre-Mickens context, although some circuits
176. See id. at 307-09 (breaking the test into a straightforward conflicting interests
analysis, then looking for a potential alternative strategy, and finally examining whether the
conflict resulted in not taking the alternate strategy); see also Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1285
(5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (King, J., dissenting) (noting that the Winkler court looked at three
questions). The Second Circuit initially determines if the defendant and his lawyer's interest
"diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue." Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 307-
09 (2d Cir. 1993). Second, the court looks for a viable alternative, Id. Lastly, the court
examines proximate cause, asking whether the conflict was the reason the viable alternative was
not pursued. Id.
177. Id. at 307 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 n.3 (Marshall, J.,
concurring)). Although this quote is a verbatim restatement of the difference between an actual
conflict and a potential conflict, the Second Circuit seems to apply this test more loosely than
intended, especially in light of Mickens's statement that an "actual conflict" is "a conflict that
affected counsel's performance." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168 (2002). This statement
also seems to conflict with the Cuyler Court's statement that a "possible conflict inheres in
almost every instance of multiple representation." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348
(1980).
178. Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1993).
179. Id. at 307-08. This argument lacks merit. Although the defendant's counsel would
receive more money for an acquittal or a not guilty verdict than he would for a plea, this
temptation is not significantly different from the fee-per-hour defense attorney faces in every
case. The fee-per-hour defense attorney also would make more money the longer the case
extends and thus, according to the Second Circuit's analysis, she would have an incentive to
avoid a plea. Thus, the attorney's interest would diverge from the client's. The Supreme Court
in Cuyler could not have meant an actual conflict of interest to be this simple, as one would
occur in every instance of retained representation not based on a flat fee, leaving innumerable
verdicts open to attack. Rather, the Supreme Court must have meant by "actual conflict" a
definition closer to that proposed by the court in Mickens-"a conflict that affected counsel's
performance." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168 (2002).
180. See Winkler, 7 F.3d at 309-10 (noting that the defendant's attorney could have
pursued a plea bargain or an "intoxication defense" to lower the defendant's penalty).
181. See id. (noting that Winkler always maintained that he was innocent and did not
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 965 (2003)
limited Cuyler to situations involving multiple representations, other circuits
had a much more expansive application, and some even modified Cuyler to
extend to conflicts other than concurrent representation. The circuit confusion
is not much better post-Mickens.8 2
MI1. Mickens v. Taylor: The Supreme Court Offers a
Cautioning on Choice of Tests
Mickens v. Taylor"s3 is important both because of its explicit holding'8 4 and
because of dicta in the majority opinion about the appropriate application of the
lower Cuyler standard to various types of conflicts of interest' In Mickens, the
defendant filed a habeas challenge on the grounds that his trial attorney labored
under a conflict of interest due to his prior representation of the victim in an
unrelated criminal charge.' At trial, neither Walter Mickens nor his attorney
objected or otherwise notified the trial court of this potential conflict.8 7 Mickens,
however, argued that the trial court should have known about the potential conflict
because the trial judge who appointed Bryan Saunders to represent Mickens also
dropped the charges against the victim, thereby releasing Saunders from that
representation.1s Mickens claimed that the Supreme Court should reverse his
conviction by applying the Holloway rule to his situation.'8 9 In addressing the
specific question before it-when a trial court knows or reasonably should know of
a potential conflict of interest, what effect does its failure to conduct a Cuyler
inquiry have on a defendant's burden on appeal-the Supreme Court stated that the
defendant must show at least "that the conflict of interest adversely affected his
counsel's performance."' 90 The majority explicitly stated that it was limiting its
appear interested in seeking lesser charges).
182. See infra Part IV (discussing the circuit courts' interpretation of the Mickens
cautioning).
183. See supra note 9 (introducing Mickens v. Taylor and providing a briefcase summary).
184. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 173-74 (2002) (stating that the trial court's
failure to conduct an inquiry into a potential conflict of interest does not reduce a defendant's
burden of proof).
185. See id. at 174-75 (suggesting that the circuit courts have applied Cuylertoo broadly).
186. Id. at 164-65.
187. Id. at 165.
188. See id. at 170-71 (discussing the defendant's claim).
189. See id. (stating that Mickens argued that Holloway controlled both when a defendant
objected at trial and when a trial court should have known of the potential conflict).
190. Id. at 174.
988
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CHALLENGES
holding to this question.' 9' Nevertheless, the Court, although reserving a decision
for another day, discussed the propriety of extending Cuyler to cases of successive
representation and to conflicts based upon the attorney's personal interests.' 92
These two discussions have important implications in conflicts of interest
jurisprudence.' 93
A. The Opinion: The Effect of a Trial Court's Failure to Inquire into a
Potential Conflict of Interest
The Supreme Court in Cuyler stated that a trial court has a duty to inquire
when it "knows or reasonably should know" about a potential conflict of interest. 94
The Supreme Court in Holloway made clear that when a trial court forces a defense
attorney to represent conflicting interests after her objection, then the defendant is
entitled to an automatic reversal.' 5 However, the Supreme Court had not addressed
what the consequences were when a trial court discovered on its own, and not by
defendant's objection, a potential conflict of interest and failed to inquire into
it. 196 The Court addressed this question in Mickens.
197
191. See id ("Lest today's holding be misconstrued, we note that the only question
presented was the effect of a trial court's failure to inquire into a potential conflict upon the
[Cuyler] rule that deficient performance of counsel must be shown.").
192. See id. at 176 (stating that "[w]hether [Cuyler] should be extended to such cases
remains, as far as... this Court is concerned, an open question").
193. See infra Part VI.B (proposing a framework for analyzing conflict-of-interest claims).
194. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,347 (1980).
195. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978).
196. Prior to addressing this question in Mickens, the circuit courts were in confusion over
the appropriate standard. For instance, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits had automatic
reversal rules in place if the trial court had notice of a potential conflict and failed to inquire.
See Campbell v. Rice, 265 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2001)(stating that reversal is automatic when
a trial court fails its duty to conduct Cuyler inquiry when it knows of a conflict), abrogated by
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002); United States v. Rogers, 209 F.3d 139, 146 (2d Cir.
2000) (same); Cambello v. United States, 188 F.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 1999) (same). The
justification for this rule was that it was too difficult to determine the degree of harm to the
defendant when the trial court had not inquired into the situation. See Rogers, 209 F.3d at 146
(stating rationale for rule). On the other hand, the First and Eighth Circuits applied Cuyler
regardless of the type of conflict if the trial court failed to conduct an appropriate inquiry when
it knew or should have known of the potential conflict. See Caban v. United States, 281 F.3d
778, 783 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that when a court is put on notice about a potential conflict of
interest, it has a duty to inquire and if it fails to do so then Cuyler applies, regardless of the
conflict); Mountjoy v. Warden, 245 F.3d 31,38 (1st Cir. 2001) (same). Thus, at least some of
the circuits were in conflict over the effect on a defendant's burden on appeal of a trial court's
failure to conduct a Cuyler inquiry when it had a duty to do so.
197. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164 (2002) ("The question presented in this
case is what a defendant must show in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation where
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In Mickens, the defendant filed for habeas relief on the grounds that his
attorney's prior representation of the victim created a conflict of interest,
thereby rendering his representation ineffective.'"8 The defendant's trial
counsel, Bryan Saunders, represented the victim in an unrelated matter until the
victim's murder.' 99 Although the defendant's attorney did not notify the court
of this potential conflictY °t the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court
had a duty to inquire because it should have known about the conflict.2 0'
Because the trial court failed to inquire into the potential conflict, the defendant
believed the appellate court should automatically vacate his conviction.0 The
Supreme Court, however, declined to extend the Holloway automatic reversal
rule to this situation. 3 Instead, the Supreme Court declared that the defendant
must show, at a minimum, "that the conflict of interest adversely affected his
counsel's peformance.'004 The Supreme Court was careful not to declare
Cuyler the applicable test in this case; rather it only assumed that Cuyler would
apply for purposes of dispensing with the question before it.
205
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court majority laid out the relevant
holdings concerning the duty of the trial court in the Holloway,
206 Cuyler,20 7
and Wood 208 cases. The Supreme Court definitively limited the automatic
reversal rule in Holloway to cases when the trial court requires the defense
attorney to represent codefendants despite a timely objection. °9 Thus, the
Court rejected the defendant's argument that the rule also applies anytime the
the trial court fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or
reasonably should have known.").
198. See id. at 165-66 (discussing basis of defendant's challenge to conviction).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 170-71 (stating the defendant's argument for reversal).
202. See id. at 172 (noting the defendant's argument for a new rule of automatic reversal
when the trial court fails to conduct a Cuyler inquiry).
203. See id. at 172-73 (asserting that automatic reversal is not the appropriate remedy in
situations like the one at hand).
204. See id. at 173-74 (stating that the defendant must at least meet the Cuyler standard for
the Court to vacate the conviction).
205. See id. at 174-76 (noting that the attorneys argued the case on the assumption that
Cuyler would apply, but stating that the Court was leaving open the question of the appropriate
standard for successive representation cases).
206. See id. at 167-68 (analyzing Holloway and clarifying its rule).
207. See id at 168-69 (analyzing Cuyler and clarifying its rule).
208. See id. at 169-72 (analyzing Wood and clarifying its rule).
209. Id. at 167-68.
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court should know of the potential conflict and fails to inquire.2" 0 The Supreme
Court reiterated that the limitation was justified because the defense counsel is
best able to know of the problems a potential conflict might cause, and the
objection is an assertion that these problems are insurmountable.21" ' In regards
to Cuyler, the Supreme Court in Mickens stated that Cuyler confers a duty upon
the trial court to inquire when it "knows or reasonably should know that a
particular conflict exists," a situation that it distinguished from a "vague,
unspecified possibility of conflict. 2 12 A trial court's failure to perform this
duty, however, does not reduce a defendant's burden of proof because it has no
impact on the probability of the potential conflict affecting counsel's
performance. 21 3 Moreover, the Court noted that the statement in Wood-that
the trial court should grant a new hearing if it found that "an actual conflict of
interest existed"--created confusion over the reach of the Cuyler standard.21 4
The Supreme Court stated that "actual conflict" was shorthand for the Cuyler
test of "a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance." 
215
The Supreme Court noted that this interpretation kept the Wood opinion
internally consistent, whereas a literal reading of the Wood statement would
clash with other proclamations in that case.216 Lastly, the Supreme Court
clarified a footnote in Wood that suggested that Cuyler mandated a reversal
if the trial court failed to perform its duty of inquiry.1 7 The Court declared
that if this statement was meant to infer more than mere authority to
reverse, it was dictum that would conflict with the actual disposition of
Wood.21  Thus, the Supreme Court clarified that the failure of a trial court
210. See id. (discussing the opinion of Holloway Court).
211. See id. (discussing the opinion of Holloway Court).
212. See id. at 168-69 (outlining the trial court's duty (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 348 (1980))).
213. See id. at 173 (discussing how a trial court's knowledge, obtained absent an attorney's
notification, of a potential conflict of interest does not make it more or less likely that the
attorney's performance will be adversely affected, nor cause the verdict to be less reliable (citing
United States v. Chronic, 466 U.S. 648, 650 n.3 (1984))).
214. See id. at 169-72 (interpreting what the Wood Court intended when using the phrase
"an actual conflict of interest" (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 273 (1981))).
215. See id. at 172 n.5 (explaining confusion over the choice of wording in the Wood
opinion).
216. See id. at 1697-72 (explaining that Wood earlier stated that the Court needed to remand
in order to determine if the potential conflicting interest influenced the attorney in his trial
strategy).
217. See id. at 172 n.3 ("[Cuyler] mandates a reversal when the trial court has failed to
make [the requisite] inquiry." (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272 n. 18 (1981))).
218. See id. (explaining how the Wood Court merely vacated and remanded the case and
did not reverse as would be required if the Wood Court literally meant "mandates").
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to conduct an inquiry into a potential conflict of interest, absent a timely
objection from the defendant, does not reduce the defendant's burden.1 9
B. The Cautioning: Expressing Skepticism About the Circuit Courts'
Extension of Cuyler Beyond Multiple Representation Situations
The majority devoted the last section of its opinion to a discussion of
the proper application of the Cuyler and Strickland tests.2 This portion of
the opinion, however, is mostly dicta as the Supreme Court specifically
reserved the question of what test to apply in a successive representation
case. 2 2 ' Nevertheless, the court noted that the parties argued the case on
the assumption that Cuyler would be the applicable standard if the Court
made no exception for the trial court's failure to inquire.222 The Court
stated that this was a rational assumption based on the circuit courts'
application of Cuyler "unblinkingly" to all alleged conflicts of interest.
23
Specifically, the majority found that some circuit courts had applied Cuyler
to situations other than concurrent or successive representation, extending
its application to conflicts involving the "counsel's personal or financial
interests. 2 24  The majority asserted, however, that the circuit courts'
extensions, and thereby the parties' assumptions, were not necessarily
supported by either Cuyler or by other Supreme Court precedent.225
The majority stated that the rationale behind the lower burden in Cuyler
was that concurrent representations entail a high probability of prejudice and
that this prejudice would be difficult to prove.226 This rationale, the majority
asserted, does not necessarily hold true for other types of conflicts.227
219. Id. at 173-74.
220. See id. at 174-76 (suggesting that the Cuyler opinion and other Supreme Court
precedent may not justi fy the extensive application some circuits have given to the Cuyler test).
221. See id. at 176 (declining to establish Supreme Court jurisprudence on the test for
successive representation).
222. See id. at 174 (discussing the perspective from which the parties presented the case).
223. Id. (citing Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1266 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
224. See id. at 174-75 (listing cases in which the circuits applied Cuyler to various
conflicts including, among others, book deals and romantic relationships with interested
persons).
225. See id. at 175 ("[T]he language of [Cuyler] itself does not clearly establish, or indeed
even support, such expansive application.").
226. See id. (stating the policy reasons for the lower burden in the Cuyler test, as opposed
to the burden in the Strickland test, for traditional ineffective assistance of counsel cases).
227. See id. ("Not all attorney conflicts present comparable difficulties.").
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Moreover, the majority noted that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure treat
concurrent and successive representations differently, thereby implying that the
courts should also treat them differently.22 The majority stated that limiting Cuyler
to successive representation conflicts would not mean that the Supreme Court
believed that one particular ethical duty was more serious than another.229 Rather,
the limitation would be a recognition that Strickland provided sufficient protection
of a defendant's rights in most situations.23° By suggesting that Cuyler might be
limited to concurrent representation situations in the future, the Mickens court
placed in doubt much of the prior developed circuit court case law on conflicts of
interest challenges.23'
IV. The Circuits Post-Mickens
Although the Supreme Court has addressed conflict situations numerous
times,232 it has never stated the precise scope of Cuyler and Strickland. 233 In the
absence of Supreme Court precedent pre-Mickens, the circuit courts were divided on
what burden to apply in various conflict of interest situations.234 AlthoughMickens
has resolved some confusion, the circuits' responses post-Mickens and the Supreme
Court's own wavering in Mickens, suggest that more clarification is needed.235
A. Choice of Test
The circuits that have addressed conflict of interest claims since Mickens
have generally been cautious in their application of Cuyler and are still in conflict
228. See id. (discussing Rule 44(c)'s requirement that the trial court inquire into potential
conflicts in joint representations ofjoined trials, but noting that there is no equivalent provision
for successive representations).
229. Id. at 176.
230. See id. ("The purpose of our Holloway and [Cuyler] exceptions.., is not to enforce
the Canons of Legal Ethics, but to apply needed prophylaxis... where Strickland is...
inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.").
231. See supra Parts 1I.C. 1-2 (discussing circuits that have expanded Cuyler beyond
multiple representation).
232. See Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1266-68 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (discussing the
important Supreme Court cases addressing conflicts of interest).
233. See Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1451 n.7 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The precise scope
of the category of claims to which the Cuyler standard applies has not been definitely stated by
the Supreme Court." (quoting Duncan v. O'Leary, 806 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir. 1986))).
234. See supra Part II.C (discussing the circuit courts' search for a framework).
235. See infra Part IV (discussing post-Mickens case law).
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about the boundaries of the test. Since Mickens, the Fourth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits have noted the cautionary words in Mickens, but have not taken
definitive stances.236 Meanwhile, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have used Mickens
in support of a position that limits Cuyler to multiple representation. 237 This
stance is a clear following of the Mickens cautioning as neither circuit had
previously limited Cuyler to only successive representation.235 Closely following
the pre-Mickens trend in the circuits, the Eighth Circuit has stated that Mickens
limits Cuyler to all types of multiple representation, both concurrent and
successive. 239  On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit-contradicting its
recognition of the cautioning in an earlier post-Mickens case24 ---and the First
Circuit appear to misread Mickens as authority for extending Cuyler to other
situations.24' Therefore, although several circuits have taken notice of the
cautioning in Mickens, confusion still exists over the appropriate test to be
applied in various conflict situations.
236. See Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1064 n.17 (11 th Cir. 2002) (stating that
Mickens requires the defendant to show that the "conflict of interest adversely affected his
counsel's performance," without stating whether this conflict is all the defendant has to show);
Holleman v. Cotton, 301 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that Mickens casts doubts upon
the use of the Cuyler test in successive representation cases); Rubin v. Gee, 292 F.3d 396, 402
n.2 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting doubt expressed in Mickens about applying Cuyler outside of
multiple representation situations but still finding Cuyler was appropriate when two attorneys
advised a client on how to evade police to secure their fee).
237. See Smith v. Hofbauer, 312 F.3d 809, 816 (6th Cir. 2002) (referring to Mickens for
support of the position that Cuyler has not been extended to situations other than joint
representation in denying defendant's challenge); Montoya v. Lytle, No. 01-2318, 2002 WL
31579759, at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 20, 2002) ("The Supreme Court.. . has never'extended the
Cuyler standard to cases involving successive ... representation." (citing Mickens v. Taylor,
535 U.S. 162, 175 (2002))), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2096 (2003).
238. See Riggs v. United States, 209 F.3d 828, 831 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[Tihis circuit
applies the Cuyler analysis to all Sixth Amendment conflict of interest claims."); United States
v. Winkle, 722 F.2d 605, 610 (10th Cir. 1983) (applying Cuyler to situations of multiple
representation in which the defense counsel also represented a government witness).
239. See United States v. Young, 315 F.3d 911, 915 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Mickens in
support of the circuit's prior position in Caban that Cuyler was limited to multiple
representation claims and that Strickland was the appropriate standard elsewhere); see also
Caban v. United States, 281 F.3d 778, 782 (8th Cir. 2002) (recognizing a recent trend in the
circuits to limit Cuyler to multiple representation situations and then limiting it to those
situations).
240. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (discussing Holleman v. Cotton, 301 F.3d
737, 743 (7th Cir. 2002)).
241. See United States v. Fuller, 312 F.3d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 2002) (referencing Mickens
for authority to extend Cuyler to a situation where the defendant claimed that his counsel's
interest in shielding himself from malpractice for former bad advice caused him to not advocate
as vigorously in defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea); United States v. Burgos-
Chaparro, 309 F.3d 50, 52 (1 st Cir. 2002) (requiring a "lesser showing" when any conflict of
interest is present, as opposed to a standard ineffectiveness of counsel challenge).
994
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CHALLENGES
B. Duty of the Trial Court
Despite the Supreme Court's explicit statement in Mickens that the failure
of a trial court to conduct an inquiry into a potential conflict of interest does not
reduce a defendant's burden on appeal,242 the circuit courts that have addressed
the issue since Mickens have not uniformly adopted one standard. The Second
and Seventh Circuits have adopted a literal reading of the Mickens opinion and
find that Mickens leaves it unclear what standard to apply, but determine that
the standard certainly is no lower than Cuyler.2 43 This reading appears to be
appropriate given the Supreme Court's statement that the case was argued on
the assumption that Cuyler would apply but that this assumption may not have
been correct. 244 For the Second Circuit, this reading of Mickens reversed their
pre-Mickens case law, which had an automatic reversal rule when the trial court
failed in its duty to inquire.24' On the other hand, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
have taken a more expansive reading of Mickens and state that it extends
Cuyler to all cases in which the trial court knew or should have known of the
potential conflict and failed to inquire.246 This reading of Mickens appears to
be too expansive given the Supreme Court's cautioning on applying Cuyler
outside the concurrent representation situation and its statement that the parties
argued the case on the assumption that Cuyler would apply without actually
deciding that Cuyler did apply.24' This reading, however, did have the effect of
reversing the Ninth Circuit's prior automatic reversal rule in cases in which the
trial court failed to inquire into a potential conflict.248 Lastly, the Eight Circuit
has taken a middle path and ruled that, in multiple representation situations, if
the defendant did not object to the representation, then he must meet the Cuyler
242. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176 (2002).
243. See United States v. Blount, 291 F.3d 201, 211-12 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that
Mickens requires the defendant to at least meet the Cuyler test on appeal); see also Holleman v.
Cotton, 301 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2001 ) (noting that Mickens casts doubt on whether Cuyler
should be applied to cases where trial judges have failed to inquire into conflicts of interest in
successive representation situations).
244. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174-76 (questioning the application of Cuyler).
245. See Blount, 291 F.3d at 211-12 (reversing prior case history of an automatic reversal
rule when a trial court fails to conduct a Cuyler inquiry).
246. See United States v. Solomon, No. 01-7045, 2002 WL 827593, at *2 (10th Cir.
May 2, 2002) (applying Cuyler implicitly where the trial court failed to inquire into potential
conflict); Collins v. Johnson, No. 01-35585, 2002 WL 826333, at *2 (9th Cir. May 1, 2002)
(same), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1119 (2003).
247. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176 (2002) (stating that the test for successive
representation remains an open question).
248. See Collins, 2002 WL 827593, at *2 (overturning the automatic reversal rule from
Campbell).
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test, but if the defendant did object, then he need only show an actual conflict
and not an adverse effect.249 In all other situations, the Eighth Circuit stated it
would follow its pre-Mickens case law and apply Strickland.250 Thus, despite
the Supreme Court's ruling in Mickens, the circuits are still in conflict over the
effect of a trial court's failure to conduct a Cuyler inquiry. Therefore, more
guidance is needed. 5'
V Policy of Conflicts and Tests
A. Concerns Posed by Various Conflicts
Each type of conflict of interest-successive representation, concurrent
representation, and personal interest-presents its own dangers. The dangers
that arise when a conflict implicates the personal interests of the attorney are
different from the dangers that arise when two clients' (or former clients')
interests conflict.2 2 A personal interest conflict tests an attorney's loyalty to
one client.253 The danger is that the attorney might be compromised in his
representation of the client because of the possibility of personal enrichment or
254loss dependent upon the representation. For example, a media rights contract
may encourage the counsel to misuse the judicial process for the sake of his
enrichment and publicity, effectively profiting from the misery of the victim
and family.255 Nevertheless, in these situations, the attorney is still in a position
to act in a way that will further his client's interests.25 6 For instance, in the
media rights situation, the attorney could choose to resist temptation and
represent his client as if no media rights contract was present.
249. See United States v. Young, 315 F.3d 91, 915 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating the rules
from Mickens for multiple representation cases).
250. See id. (stating that the Eighth Circuit would follow Caban and apply Strickland
outside of the multiple representation challenges).
251. See infra Part VI (recommending a framework for analyzing all conflicts of interest
and for choosing the appropriate test to apply).
252. See Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1271 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (stating the quandary
faced by a conflicted attorney).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1273.
256. See Beets v. Collins, 986 F.2d 1478, 1492 (5th Cir. 1993) (Higginbotham, J.,
concurring) ("Lawyers who have a choice but fail to choose correctly are of a different genre
from lawyers who have no choice."), modified by 65 F.3d 1258 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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On the other hand, a conflict that involves the interest of two or more
clients is more troublesome.Y In that situation, when the conflict becomes
actual, no matter how the attorney acts, he will harm the interests of at least one
of his clients. s8 Thus, the attorney may be forced into inaction. Courts have
noted that the danger in dual representation conflict cases is not in what the
attorney might do, but rather in what the attorney avoids doing.259 Conversely,
the danger in a personal conflicts case is in what the attorney may do; that is,
further his own interest at the expense of his client's. 260 Trying to prove a
negative-that the attorney did not do something he should have done-is
harder than proving an affirmative-that the attorney did something he should
not have done. The Supreme Court has recognized this difficulty.26' Thus, the
Court in Cuyler lowered the defendant's burden in multiple representation
cases to account for this difficulty.2 62 Although there is a danger in some
personal interest conflicts that an attorney may fail to act in order to advance his
own interests, the difference from multiple representation failures to act is that
the attorney has a choice to act properly without harming any of his clients.
The hope is that the ethical rules will keep this attorney in line.
Going one step further, the danger in concurrent representation of
codefendants is worse than the dangers posed in successive representation of
either witnesses and defendants or codefendants.263 In a concurrent
257. SeeBeetsv. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258,1271 (SthCir. 1995) (discussing dangers ofmultiple
representation).
258. See id. at 1270 ("Counsel can properly turn in no direction. He must fail one [client]
or do nothing and fail both." (quoting Beets v. Collins, 986 F.2d 1478, 1492 (5th Cir. 1993)
(Higginbotham, J., concurring))).
259. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,489-90 (1978) (explaining how an attorney
involved in dual representation might be conflicted into inaction).
260. In some personal interest conflicts, there is a danger that an attorney may not act in
order to advance his own interests, thereby requiring the defendant to prove a negative. For
instance, in Beets, the defendant alleged that her attorney did not withdraw and testify due to the
media rights contract. Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1261 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). This
situation, however, differs only in the degree, not the kind, of pressure an attorney normally
faces when paid hourly. In that situation, the attorney will reap personal financial gain by
dragging out the case, which can be done by inaction. But, the attorney still has a choice and
can act in a way that furthers the interests of his client. Ethics should bind the attorney to the
right course. In a conflict involving two or more clients, however, the attorney may not have a
choice that would not harm either. Id. at 1271. In these situations, the bounds of ethics may not
be sufficient. Thus, the courts allow a presumption of prejudice in these situations.
261. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942) (refusing to inquire into the
degree of prejudice).
262. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980).
263. See Green, supra note 49, at 1219 (discussing why concurrent representation raises
graver concerns than simultaneous representation).
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representation situation, the attorney may have to face a situation where he
cannot protect both defendants' interests.26 For instance, the attorney could
not argue on behalf of one defendant that the other was the ring leader.265
Moreover, the lawyer might be restrained from challenging evidence against
one defendant because of the fear that it will make the evidence against the
other defendant appear stronger.2" General ethics principles also support the
view that concurrent representation is more troublesome than successive
representation.
267
On the other hand, the danger present in successive representation is that
the first client's confidences will be compromised or will prevent full
representation of the current client.26 But because the attorney's representation
of one client has ceased, the potential for actual conflicts is reduced. The
danger is even more limited when the former client is only a witness in the
criminal trial and is in no other way implicated in the matter as a former
codefendant, victim, or government agent.269 Thus, there is not as much need
for a strong prophylaxis as with concurrent representation. The danger,
however, is still greater than in personal interest conflicts. This danger arises
because the attorney may still have to choose between two clients, harming one
to help the other, or harming both by inaction. 270  Therefore, a burden
somewhere between that imposed in concurrent situations and that imposed in
personal interest situations may be justified.
B. Policy Rationale Behind the Application ofEach Test
When analyzing conflicts of interest cases in either a multiple
representation situation or an attorney's personal interests conflict, one should
start with the premise that a conflict challenge is merely a specific type of
ineffective assistance of counsel challenge.27' As such, it is ultimately a
264. See Beetsv. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1271 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (discussing dangers
of multiple representation).
265. See Green, supra note 49, at 1203 (discussing the dangers, both obvious and hidden,
in concurrent representation).
266. Id.
267. See id. at 1215-16 (discussing disparate ethical treatment of successive and
concurrent representations).
268. See id. at 1216 (outlining the danger of successive representations).
269. See id. at 1217-18 (noting how this conflict only affects a single aspect of the trial, the
cross-examination of that one witness).
270. Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d. 1258, 1271 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
271. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,692 (1984).
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challenge based on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.272 Thus, a
defendant must demonstrate more than a violation of an ethical rule to warrant
a reversal of his conviction.273 Instead, the goal of the courts has been ensuring
a reliable and just result, not necessarily a perfect process.274 Therefore, the
focus of the inquiry should not be on the presence or lack of a conflict, but
rather it should be on whether the conflict rendered counsel's assistance
ineffective, thereby compromising the reliability of the result.
Some commentators argue for extension of the automatic reversal rule
whenever the trial court fails to inquire when it "knows or reasonably should
know" a conflict exists.275 They argue that if a trial court fails to inquire into an
actual conflict, the defendant already has been denied his right to conflict-free
counsel.276 This reasoning is flawed because the inquiry is not meant to
determine if a conflict existed, but rather to determine if a conflict deprived the
defendant of effective assistance of counsel.277 Unlike straight ineffective
assistance cases, however, the Supreme Court has stated that, in conflicts of
interest cases, the defendant need not show prejudice; rather, prejudice will be
presumed if an adverse effect on the attorney's performance can be shown.278
The proponents of the automatic reversal rule argue that when the trial
court fails to inquire into a conflict of which it knew or should have known,
only automatic reversal will protect a defendant's interest.279 The argument is
based on the idea that the adverse effect test is too difficult to meet.280 This
argument, however, ignores the fact that the Supreme Court has already
lowered the burden for defendants in conflicts cases from prejudice to
272. Id.
273. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176 (2002) ("Breach of an ethical standard does
not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel."
(quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986))); see also Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258,
1272 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("[Tihe purpose of the Sixth Amendment is not... to create a
constitutional code of professional conduct; its purpose is to assure a fair trial based on
competent representation.").
274. See Craig M. Bradley, The Right to Unconflicted Counsel, TRIAL, June 2002, at 62,63
(arguing that the Supreme Court's guiding principle in ineffective assistance challenges is that
"[t]he defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one").
275. First Circuit Rules that a Defendant Whose Lawyer Had a Conflict that the Judge
Should Have Known About Must Show Adverse Effect to Receive a New Trial, 115 HARV. L.
REv. 938, 942 (2002) [hereinafter First Circuit].
276, Id. at 943.
277. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984).
278. Id.
279. First Circuit, supra note 275, at 943.
280. Id. at 944.
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presumed prejudice upon a showing of adverse effect. 8' It does not follow that
a typical ineffective assistance claim requires a defendant to show prejudice, a
high standard,282 but that a lower showing of adverse effect is too difficult.
283
The gravamen of both standard ineffective assistance cases and conflict-of-
interest cases is prejudice to the result.
284
In conflicts cases, prejudice will be presumed upon a showing of adverse
effect.285 The fallacy of relying solely upon a showing of an actual conflict
without actual prejudice is evident when one looks at the cases in which courts
have found an actual conflict but have determined that it did not produce an
adverse effect.286 The automatic reversal rule assumes that the presence of an
actual conflict makes an adverse effect and presumed prejudice very likely,
thereby leading to ineffective assistance of counsel. 287 This rule makes sense
when the defense counsel objects because she is in the best position to know of
the potential dangers the conflict will present.28 The rule, however, makes less
sense in cases where the trial court determines the existence of the conflict on
its own. In this instance, the rule requires too many leaps in logic to form a
sound guideline.289 Moreover, as the Supreme Court stated, it is illogical to
assume that a potential conflict prejudiced the defendant more solely because a
trial court failed to inquire. 290 The attorney, and not the court, is the one who
denies the defendant effective assistance of counsel in conflicts cases.291 The
burden the defendant must meet should depend on the actions of his counsel,
not the actions of the court. Therefore, the automatic reversal rule should apply
only when the defendant objects and the trial court ignores the objection.
281. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (stating the test a defendant must
meet).
282. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (outlining the burden).
283. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347 (stating the burden a defendant must meet).
284. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984).
285. See id. (stating a limited presumption of prejudice).
286. See Justin A. Fitzgerald & Ashley Whitesides, Right to Counsel, 85 GEO. L.J. 1215,
1235 n. 1651 (1997) (listing sample cases in which an actual conflict was found but no adverse
effect was shown).
287. See First Circuit, supra note 275, at 942-43 (arguing for an automatic reversal rule).
288. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485 (1978) (explaining why a defense
attorney's request for separate counsel should be granted).
289. See Bradley, supra note 274, at 62 n. I 1 (arguing that the defendant in Mickens sought
an "exception to an exception" in that Cuyler already provides an exception to the Strickland
test and the automatic reversal rule would be an exception to that).
290. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 173 (2002) (stating that the trial court's
awareness has no impact on the likelihood that the counsel's performance will be ineffective).
291. See id. at 177-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the question should turn on the
acts of the attorney and not the court).
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Each of the alternative tests that courts and commentators have proposed
are lacking in one respect or another. The Beets framework, which applies
Cuyler in multiple representation cases and Strickland in all other types of
conflicts of interest, is the current circuit approach that most closely balances
the competing interests.2 92 This test, however, is not complete because it fails
to draw any distinction between successive and concurrent multiple
representation situations2 93 and does not account for the impact of the trial
court's duty to inquire.294 Another proposed framework is the Winkler test.295
This test is over-inclusive, as too many conflicts fall under the modified Cuyler
test-which applies Cuyler to non-multiple representation challenges-to be a
satisfactory solution.296 One alternative to the Cuyler, Strickland, and Mickens
scheme is to have an automatic reversal rule every time the trial court knew or
should have known of a potential conflict. The majority in Mickens rejected
this alternative.297
Another commentator proposed that the Cuyler test include a burden
shift.298 Under this approach, once the defendant shows an actual conflict, the
government has the burden of showing that this conflict did not adversely affect
counsel's performance.299 The problem with this approach is that it will be
almost impossible to prove the negative that the conflict, which the defense
counsel hid, did not affect his performance.30° This burden upon the
government is a much more difficult one than the defendant presently has in
showing a single instance of how the conflict affected a choice his attorney
made. 30' Thus, although each proposal has some merit, none fully address all
concerns.
292. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the Beets test).
293. See supra Part V.A (discussing difference in risks between successive and concurrent
representation).
294. See supra Parts 1.B.2 and IV.B (discussing the circuit's view on trial court duty
analysis before and after Mickens).
295. See supra Part I.C.4 (discussing the Winkler test).
296. See Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1284 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (King, J., dissenting)
(stating that Winkler is a good test for applying Cuyler to nonmultiple representation situations).
297. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 173-74 (2002) (stating that a defendant's
burden is not lowered by the trial court's failure to conduct an inquiry absent a defense
objection notifying the court).
298. See Bradley, supra note 274, at 63--64 (arguing that a burden shift would place the
Cuyler test more in line with the harmless error test).
299. Id. at 63-64.
300. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942) (recognizing the difficulty of
proving a negative).
301. See Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that under Cuyler, a
defendant must show an alternative strategy that counsel did not choose because of the conflict
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VI. Proposal and Conclusion
A. What Does Mickens Foretell About a Potential
Supreme Court Framework?
How is the Supreme Court likely to rule on the scope of Cuyler in the near
future? The majority's dicta cautioning against expanding Cuyler beyond
successive representation cases should restrict the lower courts' application of
the lower test.302 Given the split among the Justices in Mickens, however, it is
unclear how narrowly the Supreme Court would limit Cuyler should they
decide another conflicts case. 3
Nevertheless, reading the majority's opinion closely provides some hints
that at least five justices have serious reservations about expanding Cuyler to
successive representation cases, much less to personal conflict cases. The
majority stated broadly that Cuyler does not clearly support the broad
application the circuit courts have given it. 3°4 Several times the majority hinted
that if it supported an extension, it would be no further than to successive
representation cases. First, the majority stated that the circuit courts have
expanded Cuyler "not only" to successive representation cases, "but even" to
conflicts concerning the attorney's personal interests.3 1 The majority then
quoted Cuyler as stating that it applies when a defendant demonstrates that his
counsel "actively represented conflicting interests.30 6 Lastly, the majority
in order to prove adverse effect).
302. See supra Part III.B (noting that the majority in Mickens questioned the validity of
expanding Cuyler beyond multiple representation cases).
303. The majority only called into question the propriety of expanding Cuyler but did not
expressly state that they were going to limit Cuyler to concurrent representation challenges. See
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176 (2002) (stating that it is an unsettled question whether
Cuyler should be used in cases beyond concurrent representation). The Breyer dissent,
however, recommends a categorical rule that, when there is the appearance of faulty
proceedings, the conviction must be reversed, irrespective of actual harm. Id. at 211 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). This statement, together with the fact that Mickens was a 5-4 decision, suggests that
it would be a close decision if the Supreme Court addresses the scope of the Cuyler rule in the
near future.
304. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175.
305. Id. One possible reading of the quoted words suggests doubt as to the expanded
application of Cuyler.
306. Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)). The italics suggests the
majority agrees with the Fifth Circuit that this phrase means "represent" in the traditional lawyer
sense. See Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1267-68 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (stating that this
phrase means to speak on behalf of and represent as a lawyer, and that one only represents
clients, not conflicts). The majority had previously citied Beets v. Scott with approval, so it was
familiar with the case. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174.
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noted the special difficulties that concurrent representation presents that other
types of conflicts do not necessarily bring.3°7 Taken together, these statements
suggest that the expansive application of Cuyler disturbed the majority and that,
at most, it will allow Cuyler's expanded use in successive representation cases.
Thus, it is possible that the Supreme Court would limit Cuyler only to
concurrent representation situations. But is this analysis the best, and even if it
is, should it be an "either/or" application of Cuyler and Sullivan? Is there an
alternative framework that considers the trial court's duty to inquire under
Cuyler that would adequately address all concerns?a08
B. Proposal of Framework for Analysis
The deciding issue in applying a test should be: does the attorney have a
course of action that would protect the interests of all clients involved? The
lower Cuyler burden should be limited to situations in which the attorney has
no course of action that would protect all clients. These situations occur when
the likelihood of prejudice is so high that the courts can presume prejudice.30 9
In concurrent representation conflicts, when an actual conflict surfaces, the
attorney will not be able to act in a way that protects all clients.310 Thus, the
Cuyler test is always appropriate here. When a conflict implicates the
attorney's personal interests, however, the attorney still has the choice of acting
in a way that protects the client, even if it harms the lawyer.3"1 Thus, the
Cuyler test is never appropriate in these situations. But in successive
representation conflicts, it is not clear that the attorney would face a situation
that would leave him without a viable course of action. Once representation of
one client has ceased, the potential for truly conflicting interests is lower. The
modified Cuyler test is designed to ferret out situations that leave the attorney
without a safe course of action by testing when two clients' interests are both
sufficiently implicated.3' 2 With this in mind, this Note proposes the following
framework:
307. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175.
308. See infra Part VI.B (offering a modified analysis for determining what the defendant's
burden shall be on appeal).
309. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 175 (2002) (explaining rationale behind the
Cuyler test).
310. See Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1271 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (explaining the
danger of concurrent representation).
311. Id.
312. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the modified Cuyler test).
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(1) First, the court should ask, "What is the nature of the conflict?" If it
decides that it is one of representation between two or more persons, then it
needs to ask, "What represented persons have potential conflicting interests?"
If the dual representation involves a potential witness and the defendant, then
the court should apply the modified Cuyler test the Eleventh Circuit previously
outlined for successive representations, regardless of whether the representation
is concurrent or successive.33 The Eleventh Circuit's modified test properly
focuses the analysis on the dangers that these situations would present.
If the dual representation involves two or more defendants, then the court
should apply Cuyler when the representation is concurrent and apply the
modified Cuyler test when the representation is successive.31 4 The modified
Cuyler test is appropriate because it places a slightly higher burden on the
defendant, recognizing that successive representation poses different dangers
from concurrent representation.3 5 Moreover, the modified test searches for the
specific dangers that are present in successive representation situations, such as
a threat to client confidences and materially related cases that impede the
attorney.31 6 The concerns are still greater than personal interest dangers
because the attorney could still face the choice of having to sacrifice one client
or the other no matter what option he chooses.31 7 Therefore, it is not necessary,
nor appropriate, to take the Mickens cautioning to its furthest extreme and
decide all successive representation cases under Strickland.31  The only
exception to this framework is if the defendant or his counsel object to the
multiple representation at trial and the trial judge erroneously requires the
continued joint representation. In that situation, Holloway's automatic reversal
rule applies.319 On the other hand, if the nature of the conflict involves the
attorney's personal interests, then the court should proceed to the analysis in
paragraph (2).
(2) In personal interest conflict situations the default test should be
Strickland.320 The burden can be lessened, however, if the trial court forced
313. See Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401, 1405-06 (1 lth Cir. 1987) (outlining the modified
Cuyler test); see also supra Part lI.C.2 (describing the test).
314. See supra Part II.C.2 (describing the modified Cuyler test).
315. See Green, supra note 49, at 1219 (discussing why concurrent representation raises
graver concerns than simultaneous representation).
316. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the modified test).
317. See Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1271 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (outlining the
dangers of multiple representation).
318. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 175 (2002) (suggesting that the majority would
consider limiting Cuyler to joint representations of codefendants).
319. See id. at 167-69 (stating the scope of the Holloway rule).
320. See id. at 176 (noting that Cuyler should only be applied when Strickland is
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continued representation despite the defense counsel's protests about the
conflict of interest.32' Extension of the Holloway rule is appropriate in this
situation because, as the Supreme Court noted, the defense counsel is in the
best position to understand the danger of the conflict of interest situation.322 If
the defense counsel feels she cannot properly conduct herself due to the
possible conflict, the trial court should work to resolve the conflict or allow the
attorney to withdraw. If, on the other hand, the trial court learned of the
possible conflict on its own, conducted a proper Cuyler inquiry, and found no
actual conflict or resolved the conflict-or if the trial court never knew nor
should not reasonably have known of the potential conflict-then Strickland
should apply.
Extension of the Cuyler standard to these personal interest conflicts is
never appropriate. The Supreme Court has never extended Cuyler this far, and
although the parties argued Mickens on the assumption that Cuyler applied, the
Supreme Court questioned this assumption.323 Moreover, the Supreme Court
expressly stated in Mickens that the failure of the trial court to conduct an
inquiry, absent an objection by the defendant or his counsel, does not lower the
burden the defendant faces on appeal.324 Thus, the nature of the conflict and
the duty of the trial court interplay to determine the proper test to apply in a
conflict of interest challenge. In conclusion, this Note recommends that the
Supreme Court address the precise scope of the Cuyler test and adopt the
suggested framework to determine which test to apply for a particular conflict
of interest.
insufficient to protect the interests of the defendant); Beets, 65 F.3d at 1265 (noting that
Strickland better addresses the problems inherent in personal conflict situations); see also Part
V.A (discussing reasons why personal interest conflicts do not pose the heightened dangers that
multiple representation conflicts due).
321. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,488 (1978) (stating the automatic reversal
rule).
322. Id. at 485.
323. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174 (noting the assumption that parties argued case upon
and questioning its viability).
324. Id. at 173-74.
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